Mu Xi Lambda

CIA Newspaper Article

Item

Title

CIA Newspaper Article

Rights

United States Central Intelligence Agency

Publisher

Library of Congress

extracted text

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On the·Front Lines

The CIA in Afghanistan, 2001-2002 (U) ·
H_enry A. Crumpton

D

''


In the aftermath of the
11 September 2001
terrorist attacks ••• the
President ••• calledfor
unilateral CIA covert
action, operations with
liaison services, and
support to the US
military's effort in the
Afghanistan theater.

''

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (SO
U.S.C., section 3S07)
Henry A. Crumpton serves in
the CIA Directorate of
Operations.

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (SO
U.S.C., section 3S07)
Editor's Note: The following.
essay refiects the perspective ofa
veteran officer of the Clandestine
Service who led the CMs cam­
paign in Afghanistan from
. 20 September 2001until28 June
2002. As Chiefofthe Counter­
terror(st Center's Special Opera·. ·
,tions, he participated directly in
unfolding events, from the White
House to the front l~nes. Given
the brevity ofthis overview and
author's singular optic, much
remains to be told. Nevertheless,
the narrative is designed to con·
tribute to the critical dialogue on .
how the United States should
wage counterterrorism wars in
.the future. <;5/fNF)
in the aftermath of the l1 Sep·.
tember 2001 terrorist attack~ i~
New York and Washington, the
President of the United States .
ordered the Director of Central
lntelligel).ce
to launch a "
covert action war against the al.:.
Qaida terrorist organization and
its Taliban supporters in Afghan­
istan. This order, in response to
a proposal submitted to the Pres­
ident by the head of the DCI's.
Counterterrorist Center four .
days after the attacks, called for
unilateral CIA covert action, ·
operations with liaison services,
and support to the US military's
effort in the Afghanistan. the­
ater. (j3//NF)
·

cocn

By the second week of December,
three months after the Presiden­
tial directive, all major Afghan
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE

INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,

E.0.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

~

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-041, document no. 1

DECLASSIFICA ~ION DATE: May 6, 2019


cities had fallen to US and allied
tribal forces and surviving enemy
forces were on the run. A core of

OcIA and0USArmy Spe­
cial Forces (SF) ersonnel,

1,i~~l.YS
...airp~':--o-w_e_r-=-h-a-.d"'"'d.-e_,st,...ro"'"y-'ed ~e Tali!.
ban regime and disrupted ·al­
Qaida, with approximately 25
percent of the enemy's leaders
killed or captured. More than 20
al·Qaida training camps and ·
sanctuaries had. been seemed,

I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) I
"-::-.,,..,,.,,....,-~~=-~..,--;-

Some

5,000 to 10,000 eneiny had been

killed, while US casualties
. remained low. 1 And, .finally, more
than 5,000 prisoners had been
rounded up, some of intelligence
value. '$/INF)
Although the global war against
i:.I~Qa,i.~ remains unfin~l%hed, the

initial military campaign in ·
Afghanistan sit.cceeded. The
collapse of the Taliban enabled
· the Afghan people oo begin

One CIA officer and one Special Forces ,
soldier detailed to the CIA died in combat,
both casualties oftreachery-the fmat was
killed by revolting prisoners; the second by
an Afghan teen~r manning a local road­
block. The US military suffered fewer
than 100 casualties, the majority the
tra!!!c result of friendly fire or transport
acc1denta. Northern Alliance and other
allied tribal forces' l<>sses were in the low ·
1

hundreds. )!iJf/NF)

6ECRET//NOFORN/IX1

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Afghanistan

.

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and were managed? Ana how
can we apply these lessons to
counterteITOrism (CT) warfare in
the future? kB/INF)

Authority, Responsibility, and
Leadership (U)

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UNCLA88IFIED

reclaiming their country, and

provided the US with an

opportunity to build a

partnership with an emerging

government. f$/fNF)

What were the elements of war

-in Afghanistan and how were

they combined to produce such a
. dramatic. outcome? "Internal
elements":..._those within the pur·
view of the US government­
included intelligence collection,
combat capabilities, covert
action, communications,
bureaucracy, technology, strat­
egy, politics, logistics, and

2

SECRET//NOFORN//X1

leadership. "External elements,"
pres~nting both challenges and

opportunities, included geogra­
phy, weather, history, tribal
alliances, deployment of enemy
forces, enemy tactics, regional
politics, Afghan culture, and
world opinion. Often these
elements complemented one
another, producing synergy and
positive momentum. At other
times, however, combinations of
elements created stress and
internal conflict. What did we
learn in Afghanistan about how
internal and external elements of
warfare influenced each other

Clarity of purpose, clarity of com­
. m and, and accountability are
critical in. war. At the outset of
the Afghan war, the President
conveyed unique and specific
authOJ;ities to the CIA,,via a
Presidential Finding. He rein­
forced this directive with a visit
to Headquarters on 26 Septem­
ber 2002. :His message to the
CIA leadership and those in CTC
given responsibility for execut­
ing his orders resonated clearly:
Destroy al-Qaida. Ilis detenni~
nation, which translated as raw
political will and strong leader­
ship, set the tone. Froni the·
President, via the DCI, the Dep·
uty Director of Operations
Cr>DO); and the Director of CTC,
directly down to me, as Chief of
CTC's Sped.al Operations
(CTC/SO), the authorities and
responsibilities were clearly
defmed. CBf/NF}
·
The White House and CIA lead­
ership declared the major
objectives, set broad parameters,
expe¢ted results, and remained
intensely engaged with hard
questions"md some deep con­
cerns-yet they refrai;ned from
micro-management. The QCI
provided daily brief:mgs to the
President and senior officials at
the NSC. To reinforce the link
between policy and operations,
the DCI asked that I accompany

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SEGRETNNOFORN//X1

Afghanistan

him for these briefings on more , ·
than 20 occasions during the war..
(The White House, of course, also
received daily updates from thEl
US military.) r$/!NF)
To their credit, the DCI and other
CIA leaders, especially the Dire'c­
tor ofCTC, demonstrated political ·
coilrage and leadership by allow­

To their credit, CIA
leaders demonstrated
political courage and
leadership by aI.lowing
tinprecedented
operational leeway.

''


I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)
.___ _, The first insertion of an
intelligence team to meet with
Northern Alliance Commander
Ahmed Shah Masood occurred in
May 1997. ~/INF)

HUMINT at the Core (U)

ing unprecedented operational

The US government's political­

leeway, within a clear, complemen­
tary policy context that demanded
accountability. Daily briefings
throughtext,graphs,maps,and
oral presentations kept them
informed and provided the stimu­
lus for constructive dialogue and
guidance. Understanding the need
for timely operational decision­
making on the ground in
Afghanistan, the CIA encomaged
operators to operate. Not once did
CIA leaders order OTC/SO to scrub.
a mission; but the same CIA lead­
ers probed deeply prior to any
major operation. Other leaders,
less confident and more risk
adverse, might have second­
guessed. operational decisions and
tactical. moves, or distanced them­
selves from responsibility--ejther
action could have pulled the war
effort into political/bureaucratic
gridlock. Avoiding a repetition of
errors made in Vietnam and Soma­
lia, the White House and CIA
leadership unleashed operational
forces. In so doing, they facilitated.
the application of innovative and
unconventional tactics, which led
to victory, and, in the process,
help~d to forge a CT war congru­
ent with broad US policy
objectives. JJ!/INF)

strategic understanding of the
region, tactic9.J. military opera­
tions, and lethal covert action
programs all depended on
HUMINT. Rooted deeply in
cov~rt action operations against
the USSR and its puppet govern­
ment in Afghanistan from 1980
to 1992, GIA intelligence net­
works were expanded

I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

The al-Qaida attacks against US
e~bassies in East Africa in ·
August 1998 led to a limited
Presidential Finding and a
White. House demand for .
increased intelligence collection
focused on al-Qaida com­
mand/control/communications
· (03) in Afghanistan. Liaison
with the Northern: Alliance
im roved

2 The Northern Alliance, a loose network
of competitive tribal forces, Included
TajikS, as the majority, but also Uzbeks,
Hazaras, and others. (U)

I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 3507)
·

S!CRET//N9FORN//X1

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SEO.RE"f//NOFORN//X1

Afghanistan

I E.0. 13526, section 1.4(c)

''

This agent inventory
expanded

exponentially after
9111 when.CIA offieers
started recruitillg

tribal armies.

Intelligence, the bulk from

HUMlNT, provided the means to

''
I

I

\The pace
of operational activity again
accelerated after the al-Qaida
attack on the'USS COLE in
Yemen in October 2000. ~/NF)
i

measure a number of the exter­
nal elements of war-including
the stre~gths of allies and ene­
mies~wliicn formed the basis for
US government internal decision­
~akillg-on policy, strategy; and
covert action (including psycho­
logical operations). HUMINT
afforded the CIA considerabl.e
influence over ~trategic plan­
ning, with a .covert action war at
its center, which in turn led to
more resources and more intelli­
gence. ~/NF}

(

s. With ll() US Embassy in Kabul and the
activities of al-Qaida spanning the globe,
intelligence operations ~inst Usama bin
Laaen (UBL) were ban ed by a Chiefof
Station (COS) heading a virtual ~tion at
CIA Headquarters (OTC/UBL).
INF)

I The Pakistanis wres­
tled with their fears of a new

....,,.-=-~'.'""

I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) I
.•4

5&CRET//NOFORN//X1

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C01163162

6EGRETNNOFORNJIX1
Afghanistan

''


Electro.Die mappi.Dg
te_chnology, an
intimate partnership
with the US.nµlifaey,
and fast· offen,siye
action turned out to be
the .k~y t;;· t~rgeting.-

I E.O. 13526, section l.4(c)
Afghanif;!tan beyond their influ­
ence, but. eventually succwnbed
to US.pressure and played an
important ·supporting role.

special targeting uni
're.ctly linked with eight other
US government entities, most
importantly NSA and CE;NT­
COM. 5 The CIA's Office of
Military Affairs also played an
important role.

'1

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,;=

..______.I In the final anltlysis,
'

\.

the CIA unilateral HUMINT net­
works developed over the last
two d~cE!-des -provided botnthe
critical intelligence reporting and
the muscle for covert action in
Afghanistan. ~//NF)

In Afghanistan, HUMINT was
critical. SIGINT

!:

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~

I

.___ _ _ _ _ __.played an
important role, as did imagery
.from NRO_ satellites. US milit!!n7
aircraft.and drones,l
/

I

.­

Nonethel~ss, it was the fusion of
.technicai collection with
HUMINT that proved to be the
formula fo~ success. A dynamic
system of checking and retask­
- ing multiple assets-human and
technical"-proved highly effec­
tive. For example, when a source
­
reported the coordinates of an
ene~y cari>.p using GPS (global
positioning technology)~ the infor­
mation would be forwarded to the
Intelligence Community (IC) for
evaluation and, if deemed credi­
ble, redirection of satellites,
planes, and other collection sys­
tems to corroborate the report.
New data on the site would lead
·to refined t.l'!aeisk~i~n~fi~liilw.u..1.1:.1.:.....
nal source.

Targeting (U)
CIA targeting support played a
crucial role in deconflicting tar­
get proposals, facilitating precise
air and ground attacks, and sus­
taining the overall intelligence
cycle of collection/fusiolllta:raet- _
ing/operations. Afghans have
long b~n,expert at targfiting, as_
· British arid Soviet invaders could
attest. AI-Qaida also excels at
ambushe_s against fixed sites out- ·
side combat zc;mes, rather than
large-scale military engage­
ments. The CIA and the US
military needed to target and
destroy such adept enemies
-before they could acquire a bead

on our positions. $/NF} ·


~

A revolutionary targeting sys­
tem using electronic mapping
technology, an intimate partner­
ship with the US military, and
fast offensive action turned out to
be the key. CTC/SO created a

I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

6 The US military Central Command
based in Tampa, Florida, was under the
command of Gen. Tonuny Franks. CENT­
COM oversees all military oferations in
the Middle East and Centra Asia. '(U)

I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)
SEORETNNOFORNl/X1

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e111bK11111NOFORN//X1
Afilhanlstan
·

The CTC/80 targeting unit !fis·
seriµil.ated its product to. the field,
directly assisting US pilots and
CIA/and trS .military forces to
outmaneuver and engage:the
enemy. Importantly, the saine
:fu,sfi!d, all~ource intelligence.that
enabled dynamic 'targeti:t~g. also
benefited HUl\IIINT collection,
psychologi!lal programs, and
covert'action-operations. 181/NF)

The Right·People · (U)

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The right people, bringing their
imperfe~ miX Qf experience,
pride, emotions, .and instincts,
were the cotoerstone of US sue­
ceas in Afghanistan. On 11
September 20011 the CIA'bad no
cpmponent, no staff; and no sup­
port mechanism structured to
launch and mana e this uni ue
war against a terrorist army hidQl.g. in a·fractured,land on the far
side of tb,e globe. Fortunately,
the CIA-especially CTC and the
DO's Sp~cia,l Activities Division
(S~)-had de;v;elo,l>.~cl,~e 1:1xper­
tise.over the.years 9> briild such
an organization. ''Ii/INF)

''


Within 1.6 days of the
attacks on US soil, the
eight-person Northern
Alliance Liaison Team
w:as inSide
Afghanistan.

''


I E.O. 13526, section l.4(c) 1.

I

I

'The chief ofreports, a ·
25-year veter1µ1,, marsliall~d ·a
small cadre of specialists to man­
age and disseminate the
HUMINT. Senior analysts
brought a wealth of knowledge,
including practical experience
tra · counternarcotics tar­
gets.

'Militarj liaison Officers included
a S cial Forces (SF) colonel, a
commander, and
analysts-all
'-------~
super , proven performers. They
were given complete access to
CTC/SO information and imme­
. diately assumed·mvaluable, fully
integr~~~J'f'l~+ (/f/ltff')

I

' i

I

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)
Within days of 9/11, the Director
· ofCTC reciilled me from a for·
eign assigru:n'ent to establish and
leadfCTC/SO; My deputy was a
' ---"".""-----,...J.The Head­
quarters component focused on
Nayal Academy graduate with 26.
strategic goals, linked :Policy and
years ,of gov~en.t service, "Who
operations, assembled and dis­
ha.d WQrked QT targets in South
seminated intelligence;. and
-Asia. CTC/80 included a covert
coordinated support for the van­
action ops ·o:fii~ a former
guards of the war: the CIA
Mari:Q.
teams deployed into Afghani•
stan. 1,8//NF)
E.O. 13526, section l.4(c)

network so that they could
resi:>ond to widely varying geo­
graphic, tribal, and tactical
conditions. Each collected local
informti~on, received bro~d all­
sow;ce intelli~nce from OTC/SO,
assessedi}.s own situations, made
deciBions, coordinated with Head­
qutirters to gauge strategic
·consequences, and, most of all,·
executed it.a core mission, which
was to find and use all means to
destroy al-Qaida. A centralized .
CIA command element inside
Argbatiistan, or, worse, based in ·
the United States, would have
i.riipeded the ·better-informed, dis.­
p,ersed teams on the ground.
CTC/SO's immediate aim, there­
fore, was to deploy and support .
teams and encourage their tacti­
cal autonomy within a str,ategic
plan congruent with US g~vern­
ment policy objectives. (1211/NF)
These teams blended diverse tal­

.e~ts and b~ted highly

experi~nced leaders who excelled
in misaioriB demanding indepen­
dence and in,itiative: Despite the
erosion of'CIA paramilitary (PM)
capabilities since the end of the
Cold War, CIA had managed to
retain·a core of PM officers in

. SAD.

mos onn~r y rom e
"-;u~.,.....pe...,.cial Operations commu­
nity, SAD nonetheless provided
the backbone for .CIA teams
deploying irito Afghanistan.
Many of these PM officers were
cross-trained and experienced
o erations/intelli ence officers.

I

In Afghanistan, the. CIA teams
operated semi-autonomously as a

6

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e same time, CIA operations
officers with these requisite

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.8ECRETNNOFORN//X1
Afghanistan

I E.O. 13526, section l.4(c)
qui;di:f;icatiq~s .had 1.ittle if any

militax:y ~Pe~nce or·trainU,1.g;
other thrul' baaic CIA weapons
, fai:riiliariZatian:· Yet, the right
combina#on ofpersQnnel with
the righ,t t(jam Ieadership p,roved
sufficient for the mission.
)$/INF)
In all types·ofweather and com­
bat oonditi9ns,
I
. al~mg With the
military air.
infrastructure, served as the
-umbilical cord for the CIA teams.
SAD ·pilots fie:W: helicopters (Rus•
sian )fi-178) and, fixed 'wing
aircraft into Mghamstan.
1$/fNF) .

I E.O. 13526, section l.4(c) I,

s.ADI
us

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 3507)

"'

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j

Of the seven CIA teall1s
c!.eployed·in the first wave of
insertions from 27 September
until 19 Nov!lmber, the North­
ern Alliance Liaison Team ·
. (NALT) led.theway into the
Paaj~hir Valley. :'Within 16 days
of the .attacks 0n-iUS soil, this
team.was inside·Arghanistan.
Chief/NALT, !!- veteran opera­
tions officer, spoke Farsi/Dari
a:ng. knew many of the key
Afghan political players. His
deputy, aJormer Special Forces
.soldier a.:pd veteran PM opera­
tions offic,:er, provided
compl~ri>,entary military exper­
1;ise. (!l'rom ~he Pentagon's
perspective, this would be the ·
equiv!illent of generals leading
an A-team-sized'unit into the
heart of the fight.) The eight­
memJ;ie~ team included opera­
. tio~.-Qffi~ers, PM officers, a
medic, and ~-communications
specia}ist•. They averaged.45
years:off:l,ge and.25 years pf pro­
fessional experience. Members
ofth,eNAI..T recombined them·

'

selves. at will with US military
uni~ on the ground as specific
mi~sion requirements evolved.

('87/NF)
The remaining six teams, Alpha
through Foxtrot, averaged eight
members, all experienced in
Third World crises. Each
included multiple officers with
foreign language capabilities,
including Farsi/Dari Uzbek Rus·
sian, and Arabic'

All but one team
...,._e_e_r_s-po_e......some loCal lan­
guage or dialect. Two team
leaders- wollld receive the Intelli­
genc~ ~ss for supreme valor on
the battlefield. These ~ams, like
. the NAJ;:r, combined with the US
military for specific missions.
Some teams included SF ele·

ments at the time of inaertion.
Many team members performed
remarkable tasks, like the medic
who amputated the leg of an
Afghan soldier using only a
Leatherman tool. Team .Delta
members and SF forces captured .
a senior Taliban intelligence offi­
cial, deep in hostile territory•
Team Alpha directed a. Northern
Alliance element to ·rescue two
US journalists, lost and trapped
by fighting near Konduz. NALT
I
·
Im Pakistan,
tracked Western hostages and
supported their rescue and
extraction from Afghanistan.
Some teams led Afghan forces
into combat. }kW/NF)
The CIA and IC effort encom- ~
passed scores of components and
thousands of people making criti­
1 E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

8ECAETUNOFOAN//X1

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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

!

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'

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Inteµigence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 3507)

i'

· The lel'ffi -teams .and support
· .branChes were able .to move
"<1uickly and nimDiy aronnd
·bureaucratic barrlera within the
Agency and the IC-strong
~ency: leadershiQ !llld Iq .sup­
port.~Q. fa~t.a~d ·this.
. Jin
tly, Afghan.allies
d such·smalM:ee.ms as cou,­
. rageolU\ partners rather than an
i'nvadirig army.. )iJ/lNF)

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Money and Supplies (U)

!

Funding flowed in a torrent. The
CIA teiµnsJiterally slept on.mil­
lions ·orus. dollars. The financial
incentive fkassets and tribBI
' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' armycommruidets to c0opei:ate
was substantiM and immediate.
qualified personnel. The CIA
cal ·contributions. CIA logistics
f$//NF)
.
depended on the ingenuity of a
ofli9ers a~<l$ili~ aircrews
a.mall number of suP,erior field
·~-____, ·i>m'.chas8Q,. packed, ti:arisported,
aiid air. drop~dweapo:µs and·
communicators, arid,Jater, US
Just as critical wer~ the supplies
ge·,µ.' to teaml? inSjde Afghani­
military aasistan(lE!; becaµse of
tliat kept the teams. and Afghan
stan. Firear¢ls instrucfurs, ·
antiquated tacticalcommunica­
allies. warm fed and.ca able Of
tions gear and the limited ·
cartographers, computer techni­
combat.

cians, anal~ts. soldiers, reports
number ofqualified field commu­
·
officers, translator13,_ semmty
nicatiorui officers. The CIA
officers, medics, pilots, communi­
lacked sufficient foreign.-lan­
E.O. 13526, section l.4(a)

cators, and
Others played
guage,qualified operations
.
vital roles..
officers. DIA, blesijed With expe­
rienCed officers, y.6t burdened by
a eu.m.bersome bureaucracy, con­
Moreover, customized. bundles
tributed·m.ipimal information
and unconventional requests
and res0U1'ces. fj!/!NF)
proved the norm rather· than the
exception~ For exlilllple, when.an
ethnic Uzbek commander told
that his mO-st critical need was
horse.feed, GTC/SO's experi­
enced .Iogisf;i~s offioors made the
purchases arid' worked with the
·US Air Force to airdrop .the

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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)
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Afghanistan

.\
supplies within days of the
re uest.

I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

''.,,

The CIA tea~s literally
slE~pt on millions of US - - - - - - - - - - " \
dollars.

.. ,
./

Portable hospitals
were purchasecf. and shipped.
·~or~d vests, medical packs,
Korans, foi;id, binoctilars, toys,
kii.ives, :Piclru trucks· · enades,
saddles, and
"phi.a !!Un.dr~ds of other
~tems were pushed.to the field.
OTC/SO-never rejected any tacti­
cal-supply: request from one of its
teams. )81/NF)

'"---~-.J

..

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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

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I E.o: 1~526, section l.4(c)
(

"

andi:us ru.r Components.

....Whil~--.~e-'·t he debate with the Penta­
gon cen~ on power' and '
control,.tlte dialog witli CENT,.
.the eqd; oommon sense, fortified,:
C.OJ.tbuiii others !oeusea ~ore on
by ov:envhelfuirig mutual comm.it­
· . how to·achi~ye victory. The ,CIA
ip.ent t<>. tM ~issio~, outweighed·
bweaucl'.atic;and doctrinatcon­
provicJed.,HUMINT, psY'chological
straints. f$f/NF)
,,
. operatj.~n.S eii)erienee, cash,
lethal co:Vert'action capabilities,
enti:ee 'tribal
allies.(p~us.t~e political guidance
Strategy (U)
reqmrecfiQleverage and coordi­
'The Afghan campaign involved
nate·iMse·.Afghrui·allies). In
turn, tiie'.US n:iili.tary offered
. combinins.tlie-,iii.tern~· eleme~ts
ofwar managed by the US gov­
combat'expertise, awesome fire­
pbwer,· Iog:istics and
ernment with key' external
fact;or~primarily the nature of
com1nunications architecture,
IM1N'l; and"SIGINT. .In some
the enemy and hi~ ~rrain-into
¢ases, 'the personal relati~nahips
an inter:d(!pendent,-flexible pla.p
f<?r ex6eittfon. (U)
b.etwej!n CIA:.and JJS,~litary
: pei;sonnel, mapy'develo ed in
such CT b · :;;:fi;;;;ei=l:;;;i.....,,.....,_---..J
Thefi:rst.qUestion: "Who is.the
ted the parterieiny?" St:ip. Tzu stressed. t;'b:e
nership. j§tl/NF)
importance ofdefining the enemy
with premaion, foCµSfug on criti~al
The near ad hoc formation of
nodes; a:i,:i.d recrtiitb1g, co0pting,
these flexible CWsF teams. margll).aliZing,.fiightening, c:Oere­
.support.ed:by,.U~ $,'power and
~g, or using,,any other means"f:O·
the.melding'Of orgap.izational '
enemy forces. He wro~:· ·
.autb:oritje&-and t:he· defi~ce of
"Th~·who win every oattie'a:te
res.ttictive doct~e and cultural
not really skillful--those who reQ.,
tio~s ~~e the pattnerships
der others' annieshelpless withou t
woi:k. Cl!}NTCOM's Gen. Franks
fightiiig·arethebest of all." In
embraced and, expanded upon
CTCISO, we operated ori'the
.this ~volving'co~cept of wa:r dur­
understanding that the enemy wa s
. f og a ci:itical a Qctober 2001
notAfg~stan, pot the Afghan' ­
people, and not even'the Taliban
pl'annihg session.. Moreover, the
as a govemment or institution.
clqse. lfu~ forged in the field
The eneniy was·al-Qaida, particu­
'Yith :µs I:ri~~~rfi'ghters,
espaciall;Y"SF, L__Jand the Air
larly the terrorists' qommand and
coritrol network and their specific
'Force~ proved extraordinary. . In

· ·I

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.

''

. artnerahip wjth_Q~NTCOM,

l.

~

land

to

parse

~

e.

.:Pl~.

· , :Oespite these Wa!lbington-b~ed
-i.ssuea, tiie CIA forged a solid

i ~ ­

/

Friction was inevitable
... DQD/J2
qu~stion~d

- .. - '
every.m&Jor
-geostrategfo obje~tive
of the CWCENTCOM .

,.

E

r
H

Talibanleaderehip allies. The Tai- ·
iban as a :fighting force presented
merely a secondary target, an
obstaele towal'.d"the ulti;tnate qbjeo­
tive.· ($1/NF)
The CIA launched an intensive
and compri!h~n!!Jive ·psyc;hological
operation tO capitalize on tlie
Afgh~·tracli~~ of switching
sides as liattles'evolve and.induce
'defections. through cash P.lilY­
ments, food, supplies,Jincf:.threats .
.·(especiaUY.effectjve
backed
by precisiop bombing).'. T)le PsY·
chological operations offered
potep.tial allies in the Tulib'an
· ranks choices of sul'.Vival, means
to enhooce prestig~, ~ope, and
personal gain. The center
graVity rested in the minds of
tribal commooderswho fusd' .
aligned with the Taliban as a
matter ofpolitical advantag~.
The CIA operations sought'to
shift that <:enter of gravity.·

when

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The reality of northern:1):ijik and
Uzbek opposition and Pa.shtun
ambivalence toward the Taliban
regiile and,..especially,·its ~i­
Qaida allies, prompted our cen­
tral ~litegic and psyc:h,ological
theme; The war was .east as a
battle QY Afghan, patriots against
the foreign Arab, .Ch~chen, and
Pakistani terrorist invaders. Fol~
lowing this theme, the role of the
Umied.Sta~s would be to pro­
vide the unifying strategy,
coordinated C3 across tribal/fac­
tional lines, fused intelligence,
airpower, supplies, and political
leverage for the Afghan allies, in
critical partnership wjth CIA
operatives and US soidiera, to

I E.().13526, section_l.4(c)
8EGRE+JINOFORN//X1
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coi163162
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l!te\:i) •~ 1nfliOFORN//X1
Afghanistan

Alll~ Mllltary ObJeotlve~ .In Afghanistan; Eerly November 2001
.. w. ­ ·­ - .

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.

($//NP)

Mp!lllY. PlllOnnel
~ 'Tllllfloiy hlkl by NQrthem Allllnce

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wage a fast-paced war on the
ground. ¢/NF)
The next question: ''How to gain
lethal access to the _target?" The
answer crune in two parts: Qual­
ity intelligence collectors and
cQvert action forces, calling upon
unilateral assets and tribal allies,
would serve as the. first compo­
n.ent; Special Operations Forces,
directing precise airstrikes,
would be the-second. These two
partners, CIA and. ~F, would '
merge to form an epoxy that
would bind tribal ground forces
with US air power. The joint

1~

6ECRET//NOFORN//X1

CWSF teams would provide
timely, specific geographic coordi­
nates, using hand-held GPS
devices, laser designators, and
real-time communications. US
forces would define geographic
location in exact terms, and, with
uncompromised speed, strike
enemy forces with quality psy­
chological operations, lethal
covert action, unconventional
ground attacks, and ultramodern
munitions from all quarters.
<Sf/NF)

The pi:actical application of US
strategic thinking evolved into a
three-phase war plan:
First, unconventional ground
· w~are and conventional air­
power would defeat any
massed al-Qaida and '11aliban
forces that did not defect or
. flee.
Second, US and allied forces
would locate· and eradicate
remaining al-Qaida pockets.

Third, and most difficult, the
United States would seek to ·

f .
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I '· . c:oi :t;63162

&EGRET//NOFORN//X1
Afghanistan

..


__ · ~ CJAP"lll'IOlll'lel

t MJl!tery"~

~ i'ftl'lftllly held bJ 'talilian/ 'fJl.Qaltla
+
~llad Tallb1111yal.Clilda Iodation
A·
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· capture or ki;ll specific al­
.Qaid(l leadefE!. de~ignated
)Ijgh Value T{lrgets (HVTs).
}W/NF)
Phae~s One and T:yvo, of course,
,could overlap with .Phase ·Three.
This, in fact, wtlB·how al-Qaida's
seeond-m-cQmJl!.and, Ivlohamed
AJef, wasJdlled in .a US i,ijr­
str;Ute. -But; where to begin
·Phase One? With- the Taliban
' eontrq~gcor infl:uencin. ' . ut.
· .80.percentofthe.courit .. e
few·area~of:Afghap trib~ oppo­
sitiOn.dictated'the answer. CIA
te~nis ~ould begin work ~th .
the strprig~st: ~Iliad Afgh~
~orc~s. wliere the local com­

mander demonstrated sufficient
ability to protect an insel,'te!l. ·
team and the means and will to
attaek the enemy. ~/NF)

Phase Qn~: Taliban/Al-Qai4
Armies (U)
·

W4ere t.o a:1.ttaCk.? Through
Nor(;hern Alliance partners, CIA
had~ a:ooe&s to t:jie mountainous
nortbeast~~~r of Afghanistan,
inclucijng the PaDjshir Valley,
wbtch opened'into th~ Shomali.
Plains north of-Kabul. Other
l}l,lied tribal eleµients, loosely
folded under the Northern Alli­
ance, ~eld-raggedchunks of

territory throughout the·rough
central seetionof Afghanistan.
Ethnic Tajiks, Hazaras, and
Uzbeks, with a few Pashtun
allies, exercised varying degrees
of influence in these areas and
knew the·enemy well. In. fact,
they were engaged regularly in
skirmishes and artillery
.'
exchanges w:ith Taliban forces.
In the south, Pashtun agent net­
works arid potential Pashtun
tribal allies held no territory and
there.was no organized allied
tribal army, certainly nothing
comparable to the Northern Alli­
ance that had, armor, artillery,
and a few airerart. '8JINF)

8EGAEt/INOFORN//X1
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13

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. ~(:0:1163162

.. t;l:~t,i~ I :tNOF0RN//X1

. '•,_"
.:. . Afghanistan
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Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 3507)
':Tlie--northeni qption-for inser­
·tioll.'~il.d attack,.howev~r, ran. the
.. risk.. qfalienatiilg.potential P~h­
. tun.alli.e:sfa tlie :sOU:th:and eaet.
· ·c:tA. did no.t want:tO spar~ a·
,.
riorthlsoutli civil war..With that
; •, -. ­
in ~\nd,I
Ipushed
Jor· a ,delay,in the·att~ck to allow
··- ~r~tw.hile Pasb:tun fotees t(traily
.. - and ·gElµi· strength ·against the
. Tali.J?an: :~ti~..__ _ _ _ _ __,
· · CllieflNAL'r lol;>bied_~d f~r.·the
i .- ... -insertion ofnioreteam.s in the
'
: ·· ~orl}i., ;q~-,~sttjk.~s ~g~~t
eiieniY-forees;,and tribal forces
. ·atta<:ki~g m,· cocir~ated mass.
After debate, with.no significant
. fa11htiill ,resist~cein sig~t, CIA
torWaid With the north- ­
. ~rri.option;·With
anticipatio~ .
!,
· of Pa11htUn force_s eventually jOin~
~ ; t .
; tj
• · ..·iD:g:the:fray agafrl'st the Taliban
(..:·.,i
.·: iind.'ai-Qai~a. A fast and ·deciL·
siveattack.would,.the CIA

.. moved-

l

the

h

assessed, prompt most A,fghaiis
to tak~ advwitage ofthe·Us_·
momenturii'and seektOjom the
Viinnhig.sid~;

''
''.

CIA. did·nqt want to
spark a northlsQuth

·'81/Nf) .· ·.. .

How best~ erigjige ;:µld.cl.estroy '
civil.war.
the enemy?..Recent·lristoi:y pro­
vided·the ~er. ·In.ihe'summer
of 1997 Northern Alliance forces
had coniroll~d:Maziir~e-aharifand
the lan:dbtjdg~ fo Uzbekistan, tlrtd
bad. ~anag~d·to eut:Higb.way Qne,
·GIA, ap.d t}_le -US military a.in!ed
which-nrilBfrom:Kiibulriorth t.O ·
torepeatJhis.encirclement of
Kondw;, thus encircling thou­
'Th.liban/al~Qaida forces. In Octo­
sandsofTalibanforces.fu.-the
·ber/November-200i, with US

Kondu?/iaiaquan area. ·The~Tali~.
·aITT>o\ver controlling the skies,

bari however, had maintained.
CIA/S.F (Teams _Alpha and-Bravo)
to their surrounded forces
s1,1pplied and dire~d'_allied
.Eind kept them'r~u:PptieQ.. 'J'ali­
Afghtm ground forces tO drive
ban operatives eventuaUy'bribec:l
L north, captUre Mazar, a.D.d·esta~
Gen. DostUin's subcommanders to
;f lish· a landbridge to Uzbekistan.
swit~ side8, forcillg Dostiun:fo fl¢e
C.oncurrentlY; in early November,
Mazar and.brealµng the potential ,:,,cNorthern AliiaD.ee forces·struck
seige. J!5/!NF)
.
··:ft.om the e~~temmountiµns and

arr.link

-an .
J

.....----'___
- ._-_ _ _ __·_
·
_ _· ----------------~ drove westwa:fd with a northern

.and southern pincer movement
. around the Kond'uz area. Haz­
ara Shia foree~; assisted by Team
· Delta, pusheQ. .froiµ Bamian to
·the east, while· Northern Alli­
. a.ilce1armje~, assisted by the
NALT, ~las~d· s()uth through the
Shomali Plams· toward Kabul ·
arid alao swU:ng '!l~stWard to cut
Highway One and gain control of
the SalW:i.g i'uiuiel. Tb.is ~io.sed
the.loop, trapping enemy for¢es
4i the K0ndnz pocket. In coordi­
nated movemen~, Isliiail:Khan's
: forces supported by Team Char:­
lie cut the Natfonal Ring Road in
the far west, to interdict enemy
resuppply effQrts, .an:d then
pU,shed to Herat,and· eventually
Shindand Airfield. -'8f/NF)
The Pashtun south re:qi.a.4_ied a

greater .challenge, given that


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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U .S.C., section 3507)

.

€.0:_1163162
· SE;CRET//NOFORN/IX1

. Afghanistan

''

Psy9).iqlogical

operatioP:s proved

~Jj!i~al in the

pr~);?~ation and. .

JU~nP:~ation of t}le '

-:baftlijfieldin favor of'.

,th~ Uidted States.


'l E:o:'.13S26,'secti9nl.4(c) I
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· . tribal alliea.controllei:i'.110. terrori. ·

\tQry. ·T6aiiij~ciio, insertefilito {in ·.

'·· at~~.-n~ar.Torin.KoWt under · ·

:Hamii ~r~lii'ifitilluence,. rallied. '

sufficient forces to estab~sh
tenuous operational base. ·Sur'­

rounded by e11emy fqrce~,, Team

Echo, with.US air power, man­

aged.'to
attacking
Tali~.~ col1Vl'.JY, on 17/1S:Novem­
•b,er andifigh~its'way south to
~dahar.: (3hie:f/Echo played a
.piv(l~'ro~e,· con1.ij11cing. tribal
·couricils~to . c09~rate.e:n,l:J then
le~ding'K~!'zaii~: unpr9ven forces
iI:ito .bittJ.~;r 'l:his specific success
rlo(only.achleV:eil•a critical mili­
ta:rY, obJective1 but linked the
s~tith. to.the.north. because
~zaj enjpyed a d~gree of
~Jlect tJh'.ougliout.Afghani­
stim; Adv9catfug a nation-st.ate
mofe·tha.n:ti-jbai turf, he was
·a~pfuble.to the Northern Aili­
~ce· a'F~tentuu',i)artner. The
..1•.fo:r,th~·~anc:e;,for its part,
. ~gree~l'not-tomo:vebe ond

a


destroy:an

,__ -~ 'f/~ ''"'-~:...

as

''Ki:ibu!L

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from Pakistan. and battled west
to I\ruidahar. (,SfINF}

tection,.and lay the foundations
for loc.al political .devefopment
ajter'the'war. JJSl/NF)

'. I

:

In coordination with these

attacks, CIA directed all covert

. H,;!)W to at,t.ack? Su<:eeas would
aetie>n asseta to initjate sabe>ta:~e
require sttr:prise,. speed, .and pre­
and'.ambueh operatioJ\l.s a~ . cision in.concert with'balancing
enemy foi:ces throughout A:fgha:q.. . the ptiJitical/militarjr need~- of
istan. 011e iashtun warl<i'fd:fu
:Afghan allles and combiniI.lgthe
eastern Afgna¢$n
a ac e
a convoys as
•
_
'"'t,,_...ey-1""'.ed from urban ·.areas to..
mountain hideouts. .)8f!NF) ·.
'llli.e advantage of surprise in
these military operations would
prove cn.tciai. Many Taliban lead­
For everj CWSF team. psycho­
ers and the al-Qaida hierarchy,
logi,cfil:opeta~s pro1'edi'.critical
especially Usama bin Laden,
in the preparationr{lnd manipula­
expected, planned, and hoped for
tion of the battlefield mfavor of
a slow, ponderous, massive US
the Unit~ Stat~s: The CIA.and
·invasio11 of Afghanistan, with
tribal pa#ners induc~d 919ularge firebases, providing them
. sands of TaJ.ibtin to switch si(les
stationary targets, much like they
0:1/ftee. Moreover, psychologi,cal
experienced during the Soviet
operations and cash helped to
occupation. The concept of masrecruit allies, improve force pro-

~<o;ns::-·d_o_·~-~-~-·_sP: . .i:e_: _:1_r. . :~.:. o_;_e_~

I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)
seeR!'f/jNOFOAN//X1

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.· .Atghanls~an
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Xbe Agency was too

siv~ 1 ,9yerwhelnlit!g US foree was -­
-ellslirinedifrtb.e!'J>owell Doc·
:trine:~ eXercised brllliantzy by the ­
·Chief of the Jofut Chiefs of Staff
- in ihe Gulf
:AI4aida knew·
-tbis:an<fassurooits foot soldiers
;that _the :Ullited States w9uld
present sµbstantial. targets.
rf'
-MoteeV.En-; the enerhy ~xpected US
polltic;al l~~deJ:1> 'bi otder with­
:- - __ :draw81-fatlie faci:rotcasualties, ~s
1 _­ -";' .they-ha(iinSomalia. Mujf!,iple
:;;' -'~ soitrcea liad _reported

- -.

war:

thi:il ~n. th~ gfuUD.d and
CENfCOM too s•~w to­
clos~-tbe.po;ro~loop

••.• allowing al•Qtiida
coDJJ,Jj,andets to-slip

over tbe:borc(er into

,,._


Pakistan. ­

fjrmed'efforts to acquire CBRN
weapons, and ptefel'.en¢e for
multiple te~rist acts1-the US
- -_' ~ _~teilige~~. oper__t\tiv~onven- · futelligenceiCominuDity and
_ <ll
tionatwamora, andL__J
policyµ1akefs understOod the
' ~ -conun8.:ncio8 behfud enemy lines to' ­ pos~ibility
of ~ll~?Y-o:h:atta~ks in
' - ~ _r~t and i-aily-trlbal armies and
tlie
wake
Of9J:ii.
"Washington
'!"'! . a'!ita-ck-Sifuultaneous}y in multiple- .
needed
to
deatroy
th~ ptjma_ry
directions,_accompamed by pre­
al•Qaida
san~ary,
MgharP.stan,
~- - ¢Se_airst;pkes, -seemed more than
-a.lid then- cs tiimiediaWi"
-· ~ro}?~J,e-1'o-~nemi:Ieaders.
was no tinle·to _shift.aiglimcant
~~)
,
us forces
'into the- reiion, much.
r~
less p)an and lau.nch ~ conve:n­
_·Giveµ aj_~Qaida's gfobal network,
· de:Qionstrated;qapabilitiea1 contiorial-ca;mpaign. {$//NF)
-~ :Q:ie~ei:telllY~e~Qiis.
_§ I)eployment oh.few te~ of·

_o -

Tilere-·

I

-

)

MOI'eover, winter loomed and the


prospects for·cleat skies. were


_diµlirii~. With .the Uriited
States.dependent on· helfoopt.ers
and· small fixed-wing aircraft'for
µiQbj,liiy; the battie. required con­
citiiu.on prior to the end of
.Decem:befu otherWise the eft'ori '
.oohld.slip"se...-eralmonths, The US­
.respoi:ise-demailded speed and
:fleXibility to mat¢h the vari!Wle
conditions·on-the ground. fifJ!NF>
Speed also dorde4 the-CIA a
· s~cant bilreauera.tic aclvan­

tage;· The iftserled:team.S­

-ou~paced other US government

-entities', reducing what von

Clausewitz ca.lled the ''friction of

war." In other words, with the_

green light blinking from the

Commander-in-Chief and the

NSC, CIA moved faster .than

other components, thereby avoidl:­

ing delaYs ere~~ by redundant

pla~~· repeated ~~dina~ion,

and fretful deliate. 1.)1/!NF)


'
l'

"Pliase 'l'wo: ·Al~Qaida

Concentrations (U)


Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (SO
U.S.C., section 3507)

-­ 16- ·¥GAET/JNOFORN/IX1
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-----

How t.o locate and destroy al·

Qaida pockets, in the_ aitermath of

the.TaliQan defeat? Phase One

strategy was unsuitable for Phaae

Two, ~ ~he Taliban cqll,apsed as a

unUie4·fightingforce
al­
-Qai<4i remnantsfled·to high.
mounta,in.sanetuaries. Some Pen­
tagon pessimists were stunned at
the overwhelming success: Even

CENTCOM and CIA, while confi·

dant of vi~tory, were surprised

and unprepared for the rapid pace

of success and the demands of

enemy pursuit. The strategy of

Phase One, whereby tribal allies


amd

• C0116319_2


SECRET//NOFORN//X1
Afghanistan

I KO. 13526, section 1.4(c)
carried the -mass weight and occu­
pied ground, would not apply as·
. ~fl'ectively in Phase Two. SmaJ,I
numbers of al-Qaida forces,. much
bett;er trained:and equipped.than
the defeated Taliban armies and
rag-tag Pakistani volunteers,
retreated to redoubts outside the
ti'aditional homelands ofvictori­
.· oilil, celebrating tribal allies, _
many of whom, at this·point, were
. more mterested in th.e spoils of .
war than hunting-hardened Arab
and Che_chen fighters ensconsed
. in-moun:tafu caves. {$!/NF)·

' ..

During the December battle for
th~ ~ra Bora redoubt, allied
Afghan fighters served as bfock­
ing fQrces, with some success in
.the north but very little in the
west, where ru-Qaida command­
ers-including bin Laden-and
some of their men slipped over
the border into Pakistan. CIA
operatives on the ground
·expressed to CIA Headquarters
their concei-n a,bout the limited
abilities of Afghan and Palµstani
allies, but t);l;e Agency was too
thin on the ground and CENT:
COM too slow to close the porous
loop.

The key to victory in Tora Bora
rested, again, .on the union..,.o=f--.
CIA. SF, and US airpower.

The Pakistanis

'-c:::a:=p:ctu'.:'.:r:-=e~so':':m~e,-l. ut many others
fled to sanctuaries irr Pakistan or
to their home countries. Never­
theless; the enemy: was routed, a
critical sanctuary was captured,
and time was not wasted.
·Lawrence ofArabia said: "Bet­
ter to let the:gi do it imperfectly
than do it·pe#'~ctly yourself, for it
is their country, their way, and
your time 'is ~hort." ~/INF)

a Joint Direct Attack Munition.a use a
guidance kit to convert unguided, free-fall
bombsfutoall-weather"smart"munitiona.
(U)

In the March 2002 battle .of Sha­
hikot, after weeks of preparation,
the US military worked the tar­
· get with significantly larger
numbers ofUS forces and even
greater. firepower than at Tora
Bora. As many as 800 enemy
were killed. Nonethel~ss, the
weeks of delay enabled al-Qaida
to prepare and many escaped to
the W'aziristan tribal area of
Pakistan. CIA-sponsored tribal
blookini forces, again, did not
shut down enemy rat lines across
the border. ~INF)

; _~.; ,
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I E.O. 13526, section vif,c)
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

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, col.16:3·162
..
. . . ·-:-·-. __ .... JOFORN//X1
~

· ·Atg/U1nlstan

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''


What ofthe.fµ.tve? We
JD.usthaveleat\,ersliip
at every level, With ·'

Ph~e.Tliree:· IDgh Vabae

Tar 'ets (U·): · · · ·

•:I:. -

.

empower~d w~ors

on the ground.

-A$ e:ipe~d, the last phase


·the will to-win the war on terror­
ism, but we will need more if
to-claim victory in a.ci:>nflict
that stretches before-us for1;11Jl!J.Y.
years. We rqust.have leadership
· at evE,'ry level, with empowered
warriors on the ground. w~ :ll:lust
learn the·,art-ofthis unique and
evolving contiict,:which requires·
greater in~ospecticin and intelli­
gence ,collection than past-wars to
d~te~e the optimu:µi 'Qalance
or'internal and external fiictors to

are

we

pi:oved the most'difficult part of

.. the campaign, CWSF·teams,

using~psychologierd ~ctics
. ~~stl~~fAfgJ;i:9:fi groU.ps, .
The external elements of war- ·
1Jl$ll.a!Jed to•pµ~,a~e access, ~:
primarily·
­
~obUJ.ty;;~nd s_«?metimes coopera::-,... ".:1\:·g~gaphili
._ ti&D.;, how~yer,_s~l~om· dia.this .
Afghams~-:-.:d~eply-fufluenced
tr~la~:~to act;1o~able·mtelli~
how USJeader!!lshaped the i_nter­
:·g~ce,:~st ~-Q*"-1da. l~der,s
nal elements. of war under'thefr
achie~e strateg}.c_~d tacti~i'suc­
.wI?-o ~ou.ght their own ¥u~nce
eont~~l in.ti> a micceasful ~trategy
c~ss
against anew kind ofenemy.
. ~~ tim~ ~.flee.~ The High Value
and cainp~~: Senior govern­
est/NF)
?:'arge~ slipped. int,o the
ment foaderif endorsed the CIA'.s
. ¥'~~~horde: area,
proposalto deploy sem.i~~~j;o:!lo­
All the tool$ ofthe US govern­
-W:hei:e some s~ayed, w~ others
mo-lls teruns to eonforintoitn~ .
. ment must be applied, in
Qis~~r_sed wor~dwide, witlf so~e
rrit.C~~a: geo}>olitical ~~t~e of
'integta~joinfoperations.sup"
. ~~tLire~ ~ate~ ~Y:~ocal aut~on­
Afghanistan. Surprise and
-ported· by: an:source in,.te~lig~nce
· .ti.~·working-V\'ltli CIA stations.
speed,l.n.Stead ofa slower
wrapped around a HUJWNTcore.
conventional US respOD.tle, con­
fj!ffINF)
: ·
And Hl!J:MINT must drill deeply
:foun~ed ene:¢y e:iq>ectations and
into the enemy's capabilities,
threw.them into disarr~. Well­
.plans and.intentions, and motiva­
Oo:D.~lusion (U)
~ded. psych9logfoal operatio,.-is,
tions. Why someone fights
which ·reiD;fqrced such Afghan
determines who and how he
cultural traditions as honorable
· ·''The ·strategy outlined· ·
'tights. We must craft a strategy
defect~on in trib!llfclan·waiflire,
· :'rJbove; • .. sets-fitgh goals in
to exploit the physical,. political,
wori: conibatBn,~ to the allie4
.· : ,very.unpeita~n; shJftiri.g·ter­
and cultural battlefield. We
effort. A nuanced psychological
··. -rain: We are fogh#ng.for the
must accf3)t 11ew approaches
campaign nourished Afghall sus­
.Q';l',o'IJ}~~~s in·ihe A.fi}h,an
pi:enµsed on ·the annihilation of
picion ofal•Qaida '!foreign
thea.~r, :b~t we-are also filJht­
enemy lea~ership· and sru1ctuar­
invaders" while, paradoxically,
ingfof thefuture•of CIA/J)OD
ies; and seek to resolve the
.facilitating the E!p.try of'our own
f..
inte~d.w(!,T'ft:ire:a_round:the
origins of their profound discon­
~<jr(l,Els. Repe~ted demonstrations
glObe. ·Whlle.we will make
tent. 4bove all, we must have
of c:Qurage an:d dedication by
fi#Btiik.es: ~(We cha~ new ter·
the right pe!Jple to_carry the
CIA and VS military personnel · ·battle to the enemy wherever
ri:torfy anditew met/Wdology
reaoµated deeply within.the
.(suck as thB.integrati<;m of
·
·
found. ~INF)
Afghan cultural context and
·P.reacitor collectian I at'ta.ck
won converts. }µiw lethal power,
-anti-ta.cti.caiiround warfare),
impacting on call _on b«:ihalf of
::. · ~our objectives, are clear and
. ow. concept ofCIA/DOD part· 'local allies, resonated even more
deeply.~) ·
~rs~ip_ is sound. Please keep

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rq(the,outstWJ.~ing effort . :•

· ri!J-w~ ·e_nter ihe next phase.

OTC/SO cable to the field,
. . . 5 Oct 2001 (S//NF)

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1.Q . S_ECRETJ/NOF9RNl/X·1
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Whatofthe future?· What have
we learned from the Afghan cam­
paj.gn? We have the might and

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CIA in Afghanistan